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Abstract
A new type of player occurs in the sharing economy: a vertically integrated consumer who
owns production facilities and has direct market access, often termed “active prosumer”. The
prosumer faces a trade-oﬀ between market transaction cost and substantial strategic potential
to influence both market demand and supply by her decisions. We discuss optimal marketing
and production decisions in light of this trade-oﬀ. An empirical application to the German-
Austrian electricity market demonstrates substantial incentives for active market participation
by recently added decentralized renewables production. Prosumers can achieve considerable
profit increases by switching roles of net market supplier or customer.
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I Introduction
Technological developments allow for new levels of information aggregation and thereby be-
fore unthought-of market participation. On the one hand, using decentralized information
(or knowledge) is known to be one of the major drivers of eﬃciency as discussed already in
Hayek (1945). Lowering entry cost will typically lead to new market participants of compa-
rably small scale as is the case for the sharing economy. Oﬀering own living space or the
own car is a massive business case due to low-transaction cost platforms such as AirBnB
or Uber. Textbook economics will then tell a story of polypolistic competition leading to
eﬃciency gains. On the other hand, however, an interesting and largely ignored aspect of
this phenomenon is that these “prosumers” are typically vertically integrated, combining both
production and consumption (Toﬄer 1980). Usually vertical integration refers to firms sell-
ing to consumers, whereas prosumers are of particular interest because the demand side is
directly involved in the integration process and strategically participates on the market.
Hence, we address the following questions: How will a marginal, vertically integrated market
participant facing residual supply and residual demand consume and produce? What are the
incentives of these new participants when they are small and – exceeding the case of the pure
sharing economy – when they become bigger? How do these incentives change when market
conditions vary?
In this paper, first, a theoretical model sheds light on supply and demand incentives for
diﬀerently sized prosumers. This new type of player in the market changes her strategic
role and decides about her degree of market participation in contrast to self-supply. The
prosumer can withhold supply as well as demand thereby increasing her lever for strategic
behavior or, in other words, for the exercise of market power. Her optimal decision is shown
to depend on current market conditions such as the price elasticity of the prosumer market
supply and demand as well as own and market marginal cost. Second, an empirical applica-
tion to the electricity sector in Germany serves to investigate the incentives of the vertically
bundled prosumer. We deem this sector to be particularly interesting, because two recent
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developments led to a new type of “gentailer”: First, the decentralization of power generation
increases, fueled by decreasing investment costs for e.g. photovoltaic systems or wind turbines
rendering small scale generation viable (IEA Wind 2015, IRENA 2016, Comello & Reichel-
stein 2016). Second, the ownership structure changes from a traditional system of few big
generation firms towards fragmented generation being owned and operated by small agents,
such as homeowners or farmers. These own about 80% of German photovoltaics capacity
being connected to the low voltage network (see Hanna et al. 2017, Kairies et al. 2016).1
Initially, generous feed-in-tariﬀs led to passive supply to the market. Gradually declining
they fell below the average retail electricity price in Germany for the first time in January
2012 (BMJ 2017). This might mark the change to the active prosumer. This path may be
guided in the future by increasing automation of the smart home, but already started by
“aggregators”, companies aggregating demand or supply, such as Statkraft. We demonstrate
how these diﬀerently sized market participants are able to strategically influence the market
price and increase own profits. Moreover, this application is particularly interesting be-
cause of the many dynamic switches of the strategic role of the prosumer, oscillating between
residual monopsonist and residual monopolist (i.e. demand-only and supply-only situations).
Today it is still the most common way for a prosumer to participate in the electricity market
passively serving own demand first and selling solely excess capacity to a load-serving entity
(LSE) or distribution system operator (DSO) at a predetermined, fixed price.2 Thereby the
prosumer is deprived of any adaption to dynamically changing market conditions. Hence,
we term this agent “passive prosumer”. In contrast, the “active prosumer” currently gains
importance as a recent report by EPEXSpot, a European electricity traders’ association,
underlines (Töpfer et al. 2017). In contrast to small consumers such as households still wait-
ing for the technological preconditions enabling them to play an active role in the market,
so-called “aggregators” already participate in the game today. These companies directly oﬀer
production on the markets aggregating multiple production units and, furthermore, they be-
have strategically adapting their bidding behavior to (negative) market prices as an analysis
of aggregated day-ahead bidding functions shows. The European Commission acknowledges
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their importance by including the following definition into their ‘Winter Package on common
rules for the European electricity market’: aggregators are “market participant[s] that com-
bine [. . . ] multiple customer loads or generated electricity for sale, for purchase or auction
in any organised energy market.” (EC 2007)3,4 This development is similar to other markets,
where service providers take over the role of aggregators. These parallels can be found with
Uber aggregating supply to find diﬀerentiated, time-dependent prices for a request, or tour
operators starting to oﬀer mini-bus rides. Similarly, services handle keys through AirBnB
and allow for price information exchange influencing pricing of flats. However, in other mar-
kets prosumers are already comparably big: Amazon and Google e.g. can use their servers
for own calculations and services or sell the computing power on according spot markets.
The application to the German-Austrian electricity market demonstrates the empirical rele-
vance of these theoretical considerations. Estimating market demand and supply functions
from bid data we simulate how varying production capacity impacts the prosumer’s incentive
to optimally bid into the market and produce for own consumption. This market power eﬀect
is shown to increase whenever capacity increases similar to many models analyzing abusive
market power. This case is particularly interesting, because even for very small prosumers or
aggregators and in less tight equilibria, it is shown to be optimal for the prosumer to influ-
ence the market equilibrium. We investigate varying scarcity situations throughout the 8760
hours of the year5. This diﬀers from typical models of market power where market power
issues mainly arise in peak hours whereas there are no or little markups in oﬀ-peak hours
(see e.g. Joskow & Tirole (2007), Borenstein et al. (2002), Wolak (2003)). The prosumer
may raise her profit per production unit from 0.5 to 10.2 EUR/MWh even in the range of
moderate market shares from marginal size up to 10 % of maximum demand.
In the general setup of our model, however, we abstract from the electricity market and focus
on the strategy to decide for each period about the quantity oﬀered and demanded on the
market. The insights are then also useful for other markets where the decision between self-
supply and oﬀering a good on the market matters. Depending on the prosumers’ marginal
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cost and the relation of the prosumer’s production capacity (or actual production) to his
demand, we find it to be optimal for the prosumer to strategically oﬀer or withhold demand
and supply capacity around the market equilibrium. Thereby she can shift the industry’s
aggregate demand and supply functions in two directions: the prosumer can try to increase
the market clearing price e.g. by adding her demand to the market and thus benefit from this
higher price with all of his production or by withholding part of his production capacity; or
she can try to decrease the market clearing price e.g. by oﬀering as much generation capacity
as possible. Important requirements are the possibility to actually participate and bid in a
market, e.g. via a trading license; and an independent market maker who aggregates demand
and supply bids to determine a unique market clearing price. In the electricity market, these
requirements are fulfilled e.g. at the day-ahead market at EPEXSpot.
We investigate optimal sales and sourcing as well as production decisions of a vertically in-
tegrated customer who owns production facilities6. She faces both an elastic market demand
and supply. Moreover she faces a fixed per-unit cost of trading on the market, in particular
transaction cost (e.g. trading cost, act of renting out apartment), transport cost (e.g. elec-
tricity network usage) and own opportunity cost (e.g. reduction of consumption (renouncing
on living space)). Thereby, the prosumer has a strategic potential to influence the market
price, but it depends on her entry cost7. This is in the spirit of a Cournot game, in which the
player can also change the market price altering total market quantity. In contrast, in this
paper market opponents do not react. The focus is on the prosumer’s incentives to influence
the market price, whereas the reactions of other players are, first, second order eﬀects and,
second, straightforward and known from the literature. Third, this exogenous treatment of
the market equilibrium has the very pragmatic advantage that it oﬀers the possibility to ig-
nore market power issues in the rest of the market. In peak load systems, such as electricity,
market power varies on an hourly basis. Modeling prosumer behavior as a decision problem
thus is an elegant and realistic way of investigating her optimal production and trading de-
cisions. It is discussed theoretically how the prosumer makes optimal sales and sourcing as
well as production decisions and thereby influences supply and demand to increase her profits.
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Two facts are worth mentioning with regard to characteristics of trading markets. First, it
is completely rational to be supplier and customer at the same time. This is a well-known
result in the finance literature derived from the market participants’ need to hedge market
risks. In the PJM electricity market, Longstaﬀ & Wang (2004) find all wholesale market
participants to take an active role as supplier, customer or both at any point in time (see p.
5). They also find empirical evidence for results shown by (Bessembinder & Lemmon 2002)
indicating that producers and retailers have an incentive to hedge forward, in turn appearing
as both short term market customers and suppliers. Intermediate wholesale market risk can
be either hedged or avoided by vertical integration, which makes the latter rational whenever
the first is not perfectly consumable. However, production cost as well as retail demand risk
prevail making simultaneous supply and demand side bids rational. It is therefore not sur-
prising to find our prosumer to switch between the diﬀerent roles as a (residual) monopolist
and monopsonist and many hybrid cases in between8. Second, vertical integration may be
advantageous9. Raising rival’s cost is a classical example (see e.g. Ordover et al. (1990),
Salinger (1988), Riordan (1998), Hastings & Gilbert (2005), Riordan (2008), Spiegel (2013)).
Without further structural adjustments of competitors (vertical integration on their part),
the integrated firm can increase sales and profits or even drive the worse firm out of the
market. In addition to arguments already discussed in this stream of literature, we consider
costs of market participation, which represents only an option for a consumer, and the op-
tion of altering market demand. In particular for smaller prosumers we find it unprofitable
to influence the market equilibrium. However, this changes considerably already for small
market shares, which can easily be achieved by aggregators such as Vattenfall on the German
market (see Töpfer et al. 2017).
The closest analytical description of prosumers in particular can be found in literature on
vertical integration, in particular with Bushnell et al. (2008) and Mansur (2007). Both con-
tributions are based on so-called “gentailers”, i.e. electricity generating companies integrated
to the retail market, who still have to forecast their final customers’ demand. The authors in-
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corporate the internal procurement of electricity as long(er) term bilateral contracts, with the
gentailer ultimately showing up either as net-seller or net-buyer on the (day-ahead) market.
However, since they argue that retail prices are usually highly regulated and hence predeter-
mined, as well as that demand is perfectly inelastic, any strategic component of self-supply
vs. market participation is missing. This also holds for Boom (2009) who introduces retail
competition by enabling consumers to switch to the retailer with the lower price. In contrast
to e.g. avoiding double marginalization, we argue that organizational theories explaining
vertical integration e.g. via transaction costs or enhanced decision rights do not apply for
small scale prosumers. This is because contracts with a local load-serving entity which also
includes supply security compares to the risk of investing in own generation along with the
financial burden and the complex possibilities of selling the production in the diﬀerent elec-
tricity markets (see Bresnahan & Levin 2012, Joskow 2010).
Prosumers as new market participants also receive particular attention in electricity mar-
ket literature. This includes a special issue in the IAEE Journal “Economics of Energy &
Environmental Policy” (2017, Vol 6/1) on ProSumAge, i.e. prosumers who also have the
possibility to store their generation (see Green & Staﬀell 2017). In general, the contributions
focus either on the use of flexibility or storage for optimal bidding strategies e.g. during
the day (e.g. Shirazi & Jadid 2017, Ottesen et al. 2016); or on system models extended
by allowing for prosumers to participate: the result of the prosumer’s profit maximization
serves as input for a cost minimization problem of an independent system operator who is
supposed to find the least expensive way to meet demand when also taking transmission line
constraints, loop flows etc. into account (e.g. Rigo-Mariani et al. 2014, Schill et al. 2017).
These applied simulations, however, usually consider the market clearing price as exogenous
to the prosumers’ decisions.
To summarize, we claim that there is a new kind of agent, the active prosumer, who has a new
possibility to participate in the market. To address the issue of implications for the market
and whether active participation actually is profitable, we set up a theoretical model in section
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II to analytically derive the optimal decisions for a single prosumer facing a competitive fringe,
relaxing the price taking assumption. We show conditions for when and how to adjust market
participation to yield a profit gain compared to passive presumption, which depends on the
marginal costs of the prosumers’ production unit, demand and supply elasticities as well as
on the relation of prosumer’s own demand and production capacity. Section III contains
an empirical calibration of the model, based amongst others on hourly demand elasticities
estimated using bidding data from the German-Austrian day-ahead electricity market. We
illustrate the bandwidth of diﬀerent prosumer sizes ranging from the small household up
to classical production and retail supply companies, who might take over the role as an
“aggregator”. Depending on the technology used and the according prosumer’s production
costs we find many strategic role switches and altering bidding behavior. We discuss the
results and conclude in section V.
II The Model
Nomenclature
qPSd demand purchased on the market ps, pd inverse supply and demand functions
qPSs production oﬀered on market as, ad intercepts of supply and demand functions
cPS production costs of prosumer’s production unit QPSs production capacity of prosumer
cmarket maximum costs of generating units available QPSd capacity needed to satisfy own demand
⌘d slope of demand function Qmarketd maximum market demand (excl. prosumer)
⌘s slope of supply function Qmarkets production capacity of competitive fringe
II(i). Model Setup
Our modelling framework comprises a residual prosumer optimizing profit in a market with
given demand and supply. The prosumer’s profit is ⇡PS (see Equation (1)), where p˚ “
fpqPSs , qPSd q denotes the market clearing or equilibrium price and ⌧ the additional costs for
purchasing on the retail market, like e.g. transaction or transmission costs. The three terms
capture, first, the revenues from selling production, second, the costs for covering (remaining)
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demand on the retail market, and third, the prosumer’s costs for using the production unit.
Note that the objective function does not contain any utility the prosumer may gain from
using the amount demanded in each period. We assume that the demand in one period is
fixed and the only consideration that remains for the prosumer is how to cover this demand
at minimum costs.
⇡PSpqPSs ,qPSd q “ p
˚pqPSs q ´ pp˚ ` ⌧qpqPSd q ´ cPSpqPSs `QPSd ´ qPSd q(1)
The prosumer has the following two decision variables: First, qPSs denotes how much produc-
tion capacity QPSs is oﬀered on the market; and second, qPSd denotes the amount the prosumer
purchases on the market. We impose the restriction that the prosumer’s demand QPSd must
be fulfilled at every instant and that shifting or withholding demand is not possible. Hence,
own production capacity must be used for residual demand qPSown “ QPSd ´ qPSd , i.e. for self-
supply. However, qPSown and qPSs do not have to add up to total production capacity, i.e. the
prosumer can withhold capacity from the market e.g. by choosing to use this capacity on
a diﬀerent, e.g. subsequent, market or by withholding it completely. We assume that the
prosumer does not incorporate possible profits on other markets into his optimization. Since
our model is deterministic and the prosumer has perfect foresight of (his influence on) the
market clearing price, assumptions regarding the prosumer’s risk attitudes are not necessary.
This unique market clearing price p˚ is determined for each hour by an independent authority
that collects and aggregates demand and supply bids – i.e. price-quantity combinations – and
intersects the resulting step functions. We deviate from the fact that these aggregated supply
and demand functions are step functions by approximating them linearly. Most importantly,
we allow the prosumer to actively participate on both sides of the market by deciding whether
to enter the market and to thereby introduce a step or not. Figure 1 depicts the eﬀect of
adding a step to the supply function – the same logic also applies to the demand side of the
market. The new, dashed step function is again approximated by a linear function (dashed).
The demand and supply functions, pd and ps, respectively, are stated in Equations (2) and
(3). It is important to note that in this linear setup the maximum willingness to pay of
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Schematic PS Eﬀects on the Supply Function: (a) PS Enters, and (b) PS Exits the
Market
demand ad, the minimum ask price of supply as, and the maximum production costs cmarket
do not change when a prosumer enters or exits the market. This results in a rotation of the
functions, i.e. a slope change and constant intercepts.10 The parameters ⌘d “ adQmarketd and
⌘s “ pcmarket´asqQmarkets denote the slopes of the demand and supply function as ratios of vertical and
horizontal intercepts/cutoﬀ points; ↵ “ qPSd
Qmarketd
and   “ qPSsQmarkets incorporate the respective
market size of the prosumer and depict the impact of the prosumer’s decision variables on
the slopes. If the prosumer decides to not participate in the market, ↵ “   “ 0 and the
slopes remain unchanged; if he participates, dp
d
d↵ ° 0 and dp
s
d  † 0 holds; and Q “ rqPS, q´PSs
denotes the amounts produced and demanded at the time of delivery, i.e. the quantities all
the market participants committed themselves to.
pdpQ,↵pqPSd qq “ ad ´ ⌘dp1` ↵q
´1 ¨Q(2)
pspQ, pqPSs qq “ as ` ⌘sp1`  q´1 ¨Q(3)
We also assume that the prosumer demands at every possible price based on the idea that
in the short term demand cannot be shifted, i.e. the prosumer’s individual demand function
is completely inelastic. In addition, the prosumer also cannot shift his supply e.g. by storing
production. This does, however, not aﬀect our results, because the prosumer does take pro-
duction costs cPS into account for deriving the optimal bids (see Section II(iii).) and does not
produce, if p˚ † cPS. Modeling demand and supply as nonlinear functions would potentially
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allow us to better depict e.g. increasing marginal costs of additional supply based on diﬀerent
production technologies. However, whereas the eﬀects to be shown remain the same this un-
necessarily complicates the optimization, and the empirical calibration in Section III allows
us to depict diﬀerent eﬀects of the prosumer’s supply and demand decisions on the market
clearing price as it is based on diﬀerent elasticities and hence on diﬀerent slopes for each hour.
The prosumer’s decisions aﬀect both functions simultaneously which leads to a multiplicity
of realizable market clearing prices depicted by the shaded area ABCD in Figure 2. Point A
with the according market clearing price pA and quantity qA results whenever the prosumer
decides to not participate in the market at all, i.e. by either producing exactly the amount
needed for self-supply or by reducing overall demand to 0 (not possible in our setup). In B
the prosumer satisfies all of his demand with his own production and oﬀers excess production
on the market. Combination C is attained with full market participation of the prosumer on
both the demand and the supply side, and D depicts the situation of a pure consumer, i.e.
without making use of any production capacity. Any equilibrium in the lighter shaded area
BEC cannot be reached, because whenever the prosumer reduces his market demand qPSd he
has to use part of his own production capacity thereby also limiting or reducing the possible
impact on the supply function.
A few crucial assumptions also need to be addressed: First, we depict the market environment
as a uniform-price double-sided call auction with Cournot competition. Relaxing the price-
taking assumption, the prosumer decides about the quantities to place in the auction, being
faced with a price-taking competitive fringe. Furthermore, we assume that the production
capacity has already been built which leaves only the decision about how to optimally use it
in the market. In addition, the installed production capacity in the market, Qmarkets `QPSs ,
is always high enough to provide even the highest possible demand (including the prosumer),
i.e. shortages cannot occur and importing is not necessary. Lastly, we focus on repeating
short term decisions – e.g. on a market where these auctions are held hourly leading to
hourly market clearing prices – and we exclude the possibility to store production or to shift
demand in time to benefit from or to avoid high prices, respectively. Even though this paper
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Figure 2: Window of Attainable Market Clearing Prices and Quantities
and the model are motivated by the German-Austrian hourly day-ahead auctions held by
EPEXSpot as well as by characteristics of the electricity markets, the general model applies
to any situations where the assumptions above are met.
II(ii). Optimal Prosumer Behavior
In their most general form, the eﬀects of the decision variables can be disentangled into
direct and indirect eﬀects, captured in Equations (4) and (5) by the first and second terms,
respectively. For completeness, we also display the intermediate eﬀects of qPSd and qPSs on ↵
and   where we can see that the indirect eﬀects have diﬀerent signs because Bp
˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd ° 0 and
Bp˚
B 
B 
BqPSs † 0. Note that these fractions implicitly contain the demand and supply elasticity,
respectively.
d⇡
dqPSd
“ B⇡BqPSd
` B⇡Bp˚
Bp˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
(4)
d⇡
dqPSs
“ B⇡BqPSs `
B⇡
Bp˚
Bp˚
B 
B 
BqPSs(5)
Partially solving (4) and (5) allows us to derive conditions for each of them to occur. In (6)
and (7) the generally formulated left hand sides state that, for example, if the total eﬀect
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of additional market demand on the profit is positive, i.e. if d⇡
dqPSd
° 0, then the prosumer
should demand as much as he can: QPSd . This is then spelled out on the right hand sides
of the same lines. Regarding the optimal amount to demand on the market, we see in the
first line in (6) that if the market clearing price including transaction fees and also including
the positive eﬀect of market demand on the price is still strictly smaller than the prosumer’s
production costs, the prosumer should demand as much as possible. In other words, using
own production capacity for self-supply is more expensive than purchasing on the market.
The third line, on the other hand, says that if the prosumer’s market demand raises the
market clearing price including transaction fees to a level above his production costs cPS – or
if the price is too high even without the prosumer’s demand – the prosumer will use all of his
production capacity for self-supply. Should this capacity be suﬃcient to cover the prosumer’s
demand, i.e. QPSs • QPSd , market demand will be 0; otherwise the remaining demand must
still be purchased on the market. The same logic applies for the optimal amount to sell on
the market stated in (7). The additional constraint that part of production capacity may be
bound by using it for self-supply is captured by QPSs ´ QPSd ` q˚,PSd . This formulation also
means that the prosumer favors self-supply over purchasing on the market due to transaction
costs. The letters X and Y stand for the isolated decision variable derived from setting the
respective total derivatives d⇡
dqPSd
and d⇡dqPSs to 0 (see Appendix A).
q˚,PSd “
$’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’%
max if
d⇡
dqPSd
° 0 ñ QPSd if p˚ ` ⌧ ` B⇡Bp˚
Bp˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
† cPS
Y if
d⇡
dqPSd
“ 0 ñ Y if p˚ ` ⌧ ` B⇡Bp˚
Bp˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
“ cPS
min if
d⇡
dqPSd
† 0 ñ maxp0, QPSd ´QPSs q if p˚ ` ⌧ ` B⇡Bp˚
Bp˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
° cPS
(6)
q˚,PSs “
$’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’%
max if
d⇡
dqPSs
° 0 ñ QPSs ´QPSd ` q˚,PSd if p˚ `
B⇡
Bp˚
Bp˚
B 
B 
BqPSs ° c
PS
X if
d⇡
dqPSs
“ 0 ñ X if p˚ ` B⇡Bp˚
Bp˚
B 
B 
BqPSs “ c
PS
min if
d⇡
dqPSs
† 0 ñ 0 if p˚ ` B⇡Bp˚
Bp˚
B 
B 
BqPSs † c
PS
(7)
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The optimal decisions for q˚,PSd and q˚,PSs can be described using a case distinction (see (6)
and (7)) that is based on the signs of the total derivatives of (4) and (5). Conveniently,
this allows us to uniquely describe 9 diﬀerent attainable market equilibria which we already
graphically described in Figure 2 above and which we summarize in Table I. Again, there
are the 4 “corner cases” A-D, the lines connecting and confining the feasible set, e.g. BC, as
well as the “interior” solution ABCD describing the area between.
Table I
Comparison of Optimal Decisions: 9 Cases
d⇡
dqPSd
† 0 “ 0 ° 0
° 0 B BC C
d⇡
dqPSs
“ 0 AB ABCD CD
† 0 A AD D
We further proceed by combining the results of (6) and (7) according to Table I. We know,
for example, that in Case A the prosumer uses all of his production capacity for self-supply
and does not oﬀer any excess production on the market (assuming that his production capac-
ity is larger than his demand). This translates to qPSd “ 0 and qPSs “ 0. Plugging this into
the partially solved total derivatives, the first equation or inequality in each case is derived
from d⇡
dqPSd
; the second is derived from d⇡dqPSs . As we defined ↵ “
qPSd
Qmarketd
and   “ qPSsQmarkets the
indirect eﬀect of a decision variable on the market clearing price conveniently vanishes when
the according decision variable in the numerator is chosen as 0. In other words, the variable
does not influence the market clearing price.
Case A – Lone Wolf: qPSd “ 0 ^ qPSs “ 0
p˚ ` ⌧ ° cPS(8)
p˚ † cPS(9)
Assuming QPSs ° QPSd , this first case can be used as a baseline: the prosumer is not present
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at the market at all, hence “lone wolf”. This situation can occur when the market clearing
price is smaller than the prosumer’s production costs (9) and the transaction costs ⌧ suﬃce to
invert this inequality (8), in other words, when the production costs lie between the wholesale
and the retail price. Combining both inequalities yields the simple result: ⌧ ° 0.
Case B – Pure Monopolist: qPSd “ 0 ^ qPSs “ QPSs ´QPSd
p˚ ` ⌧ ° cPS(10)
p˚ ` pQPSs ´QPSd qBp
˚
B 
B 
BqPSs ° c
PS(11)
Again assuming QPSs ° QPSd , qPSd “ 0 and the bracketed term in (11) reduces to pqPSs “
QPSs ´ QPSd q which means that the indirect eﬀect remains negative. These two inequalities
state that for the prosumer to be pure monopolist, first, the retail price is higher than the
production costs, and second, that the same holds when the price is reduced by the residual
production quantity.
Case C – Standard Market Participant: qPSd “ QPSd ^ qPSs “ QPSs
p˚ ` ⌧ ` pQPSd ´QPSs qBp
˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
† cPS(12)
p˚ ´ pQPSd ´QPSs qBp
˚
B 
B 
BqPSs ° c
PS(13)
Combining the inequalities yields the following inequality (14) where three main determinants
remain: the sign of the bracketed term which depends on whether production capacity is
larger than the prosumer’s demand or not; the signs and the size of the eﬀects of both
decision variables on the price; as well as the existence of transaction costs.
⌧ † pQPSs ´QPSd q
ˆBp˚
B 
B 
BqPSs `
Bp˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
˙
(14)
Case D – Pure Monopsonist: qPSd “ QPSd ^ qPSs “ 0
p˚ ` ⌧ `QPSd Bp
˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
† cPS(15)
p˚ † cPS(16)
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Here we see in both inequalities, that the price remains below the production costs, even if
it is increased by the eﬀect of qPSd . Hence, it is intuitive, that the prosumer does not make
use of his production capacity.
Case AB – Strategic Monopolist: qPSd “ 0 ^ qPSs “ X
p˚ ` ⌧ ° cPS(17)
p˚ `X Bp
˚
B 
B 
BqPSs “ c
PS(18)
For the sake of analysis we again assume QPSs ° QPSd . Inequality (17) states that the retail
price is higher than the production costs. However, according to (18) the prosumer can
strategically reduce the price to such a degree that it equals his production costs. Any
further reduction would reduce his profits. Combining the statements yields the following
additional result:
⌧ ° X Bp
˚
B 
B 
BqPSs(19)
Case AD – Strategic Monopsonist: qPSd “ Y ^ qPSs “ 0
p˚ ` ⌧ ` Y Bp
˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
“ cPS(20)
p˚ † cPS(21)
Inequality (20) shows that the prosumer can strategically increase the price to match exactly
his production costs plus transaction costs. Without the indirect eﬀect the price would remain
below the costs. Combining the results again shows that the indirect eﬀect must again be
lower than the transaction costs in this case:
⌧ ° ´Y Bp
˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
(22)
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Case BC – Partial Demander: qPSd “ Y ^ qPSs “ QPSs ´QPSd ` Y
p˚ ` ⌧ ´ pQPSs ´QPSd qBp
˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
“ cPS(23)
p˚ ` pQPSs ´QPSd qBp
˚
B 
B 
BqPSs ° c
PS(24)
Combining both statements again yields the additional characteristic result:
pQPSs ´QPSd q
ˆBp˚
B 
B 
BqPSs `
Bp˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
˙
° ⌧(25)
Case CD – Partial Supplier: qPSd “ QPSd ^ qPSs “ X
p˚ ` ⌧ ´ pX ´QPSd qBp
˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
† cPS(26)
p˚ ` pX ´QPSd qBp
˚
B 
B 
BqPSs “ c
PS(27)
The combination of both statements yields:
pX ´QPSd q
ˆBp˚
B 
B 
BqPSs
Bp˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
˙
° ⌧(28)
Case ABCD – Partial Demander and Supplier: qPSd “ Y ^ qPSs “ X
p˚ ` ⌧ ´ pX ´ Y qBp
˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
“ cPS(29)
p˚ ` pX ´ Y qBp
˚
B 
B 
BqPSs “ c
PS(30)
Combining the equations shows that in this case the indirect eﬀect of qPSs plus the indirect
eﬀect of qPSd , multiplied by the diﬀerence of decision variables, equals the transaction costs:
pX ´ Y q
ˆBp˚
B 
B 
BqPSs `
Bp˚
B↵
B↵
BqPSd
˙
“ ⌧(31)
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The results for the 9 cases above show that active prosumption, i.e. actively and strategically
choosing market demand and market production, depends on three relations: first, on the
relation of market clearing price (including transaction costs) and production costs, i.e. of
p˚, ⌧ , and cPS, the latter mainly being determined by the prosumer’s choice of production
technology; second, on the size of the indirect eﬀect of the prosumer’s decision variables
on the market clearing price, i.e. on the demand and supply elasticities; and third, on
the characteristics of the prosumer, like e.g. the relative size of his demand to production
capacity as well as his size compared to the rest of the market. An immediate conclusion is
that the diﬀerent situations outlined above will occur only when the market clearing price
and production costs are close. We already see this in Figure 2 as the prosumer’s production
costs cPS must lie somewhere within the window of attainable market clearing prices; this
is especially true when the prosumer is only a small agent, since the eﬀect of the decision
variables on the market clearing price are limited by the production capacity and by the
prosumer’s demand and this window must necessarily remain small. However, aggregating
multiple prosumers by centrally controlling their demand and supply increases the size of
this active market participant as well as the opportunity to actively adapt to any market
environment. Analyzing the cases and the according conditions yields information on the
interaction between a prosumer and his market environment. Hence, by simulating certain
market situations or by using real data we are able to predict the prosumer’s behavior as
well as the market outcome.
II(iii). Constrained Optimization
In the previous part we saw that the optimal choice of one decision variable also depends
on and interacts with the other; in addition, capacity constraints only implicitly played a
role for analyzing the diﬀerent cases and possible outcomes. These issues suggest using an
approach which allows for simultaneously solving the optimization. The objective function
remains the same as above (see (1)) and the necessary constraints are stated in (32) and (33)
below. Delays or costs for starting the production unit or for increasing or decreasing supply
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are not included as we assume them to be included in the production costs denoted by cPS.
QPSs • qPSs `QPSd ´ qPSd(32)
Qmarkets ` qPSs ´Qmarketd ´ qPSd • 0(33)
nonnegativity for decision variables and Lagrange multipliers(34)
The first constraint (32) states that the prosumer cannot produce more than his own pro-
duction capacity. It also implicitly contains the constraint that he can only use a maximum
of QPSs for self-supply; also, both cases production capacity being larger than the prosumer’s
demand and vice versa, i.e. QPSs ° QPSd as well as QPSs † QPSd are considered. The for-
mer is straightforward; the latter simply requires the prosumer’s market demand qPSd to be
larger than 0. Lastly, since equality is not demanded, it is also possible to withhold sup-
ply capacity from the market and not use it at all. The constraint in (33) covers the idea
that the prosumer’s demand cannot remain unfulfilled at any time. I.e. if the available
production capacity on the market Qmarkets were too small, then the prosumer must use his
own production capacity to oﬀer on the market in order to be able to also purchase on the
market. This accounts e.g. for situations whenever transaction costs prevent the exchange
of goods and hence the functioning of the market leading to a decoupling of market zones
and diﬀering market clearing prices e.g. across regions. Examples are so called load pockets
that may occur due to transmission congestion in electricity markets based on nodal pricing
mechanisms. Nonnegativity of qPSd requires that that the prosumer cannot artificially raise
the market clearing price and then balance it with non-existent production capacity, thereby
profiting from an artificially high market clearing price.
In the next step we set up the Lagrangian and derive the according Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
conditions in order to solve the resulting equation system for the optimal solution. Since
the constraints are linear and the objective function is quadratic, the conditions for a unique
solution are necessary and suﬃcient. An initial analysis based on several examples allows
us to get an idea on how the simulation results of Section III are going to look like. Figure
3 depicts the prosumer’s optimal decision variables depending on the size of the total mar-
ket demand Qmarketd , ceteris paribus – in particular the prosumer’s production costs cPS –
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with the prosumer’s production capacity being twice the size of his demand and qPSown again
denoting the amount of production capacity needed for self-supply, i.e. QPSd ´ qPSd . Low
values of total market demand indicate a low market price which induces the prosumer to
not use his production capacity at all and to purchase all of his demand on the market;
a large size of total market demand, on the other hand, leads to a high market price and
the prosumer optimally decides to produce as much as he can for self-supply, i.e. qPSd “ 0,
and to oﬀer the remaining capacity on the market. The plateaus at A and B are attained
when the prosumer’s demand is fulfilled and the production capacity constraint is reached,
respectively. We find that only 5 of the 9 cases that presented in Section II(ii). seem to be
relevant; moreover, the prosumer never demands from and supplies to the market at the same
time. I.e. we find a “movement” of the market equilibrium along the border of the feasible
region shown above in Figure 2. This result is, however, only attained by varying one single
input variable of the optimization, Qmarketd , and does not cover the whole range of possible
combinations of demand and supply elasticities as well as prosumer’s market sizes which we
found to be relevant to describe each of the 9 possible cases of Table I above.
Figure 3: Profit Maximizing PS Bids with Changing Total Market Demand
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II(iv). Comparison to Passive Prosumption
Up to this point we were able to show how the prosumer would behave optimally to maximize
profits which is equivalent to minimizing costs. However, the initial idea for this paper was
based on the notion that there actually is an incentive for the prosumer to start behaving
actively and strategically, i.e. that there is a profit advantage compared to other forms of
market participation. Therefore, we first look at what “normal” market participants would
do: assume again that an agent does own production capacity which may be used for self-
supply or oﬀered on the market. This agent also aﬀects the market clearing price but he
does not actively incorporate this eﬀect for his choice, i.e. the only “strategic” action is to
compare market price and production costs and decide in each period whether to produce or
not, and to cover his demand on the market in the latter case. This is at the same time easy
to understand and to implement, which is why this is e.g. the common form of prosumption
in electricity markets where small, decentralized prosumers usually still have an according
contract with their electricity provider or load serving entity (see Section I). We can also find
this behavior in Figure 2 and in the case distinction in Table I: this prosumer either does
not make use of any production capacity and remains a pure consumer – as in Case D – or
the prosumer satisfies all of his demand using own production and oﬀers any excess produc-
tion on the market – as in Case B. We refer to this reduced behavior as “passive prosumption”.
The objective function for this passive prosumer is based on comparing the following two
profits and choosing the larger one:
⇡D “ ´pp˚ ` ⌧qpqPSd q(35)
⇡B “ p˚pqPSs q ´ cPSpqPSs `QPSd q(36)
Figure 4 depicts the diﬀerent profits of diﬀerent kinds of market participants when the size
of total market demand Qmarketd changes, ceteris paribus. Note that the profits are always
negative as we actually consider a cost minimization problem where the utility of consumption
is assumed to be constant (see Section II(ii).). The dashed and the dot-dashed black lines
show the profits of the pure consumer and the excess producer, respectively. The market
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clearing price rises as total market demand is increased; this is beneficial for the excess
producer, but vice versa for the pure consumer. At the intersection of these two profit
functions the market price equals the prosumer’s production costs which induces a change
of strategy as total market demand increases. The dashed gray line depicts the profit in
Case A, i.e. of a prosumer who is completely self suﬃcient, who does not participate in
the market, and who is thus not aﬀected by changes in the market. We do not include this
behavior in our definition of passive prosumption as it would seem counter-intuitive to not
use excess production capacity when price taking is assumed. An active prosumer, on the
other hand, should include this option and, as we can see with the black line, he will also do
so. The dotted gray line shows that Case C of simple market participation is always inferior
to other cases in this particular scenario. The diﬀerence in profits between Case B and Case
C is mainly due to additional transaction costs for buying on the market. In addition to
active prosumption just being the upper envelope of the diﬀerent strategies, we also see the
prosumer taking the indirect eﬀect of qPSd and qPSs on the market clearing price into account,
i.e. the eﬀect of relaxing the price taking assumption: The two shaded areas depict the
profits of the strategic Cases AD and AB, respectively. To summarize, the profit advantage
of active compared to passive prosumption does exist and is based on two parts: first, on
not participating in the market at all (Case A), and second, on the incorporation of price
eﬀects when choosing the decision variables (Cases AD and AB). Active prosumption weakly
dominates passive prosumption.
III Empirical Study
The findings in the previous section are the general eﬀects of prosumer behavior in a market
environment. To complement these general results, we illustrate prosumer behavior in an
empirical study. Due to the lack of data on actual prosumers in real markets we simulate
prosumer behavior in an electricity market. We use the German-Austrian day-ahead spot
market operated by EPEXSpot because the necessary data on the market characteristics are
available, i.e. hourly market clearing prices and quantities as well as all underlying hourly
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Figure 4: Profit Comparison with Changing Total Market Demand Qmarketd
price-quantity bids – that is the entire step functions – separately for demand and supply. As
we stated in Section I, in addition the role of prosumers in the German electricity market is
an ongoing debate. Several studies on prosumers in German electricity markets e.g. focus on
technology adoption preferences (Schill et al. 2017) or on storage with systems perspective
(Ottesen et al. 2016), but they do not take price elasticities into account. In contrast to these
studies, we analyze the relationship between price elasticities in diﬀerent demand situations
and the role of the prosumer’s size. We derive 6 typical days and their corresponding 24
hours based on market data for the years 2014 to 2016. For each of these 144 situations
(6 days times 24 hours) we investigate how an additional market participant with prosumer
characteristics behaves and how this influences the market results.
III(i). Model Calibration and Scenario Definition
The necessary data for an application of our modeling framework can be derived from the
formal description of the demand and supply functions in Section II, Equations (2) and
(3): first, the demand and supply elasticities to calculate the slopes of the demand and
supply functions (see Appendix C); and second, a representative point of the demand and
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supply function to calculate the intercepts; for the latter we choose the equilibrium price
and quantity. The next subsection contains the description of the empirical estimation of
these elasticities. Then, to model the influence of an additional prosumer, we define various
scenarios based on the prosumer’s production capacity, his production costs, and his demand.
Finally, we assume transaction costs ⌧ to be 1.5 EUR/MWh and a fixed total market supply
of 80,000 MW.
III(i).i Estimation of Demand and Supply Functions
For the estimation of the price elasticities for demand and supply we choose a state of the
art framework by Bigerna & Bollino (2014) to estimate the following hourly simultaneous
equations system as a seemingly unrelated equations regression model both for demand (37)
and supply (38). Here, di is a dummy for typical situations for which we choose the following
six: summer season (SU), winter season (WI), the remaining “transition seasons” (TS), for
both a working day (Work) and a weekend day (Wend). We include each hourly demand
and supply step function with 100 representative bids for the 24 hours of a working day
and a weekend day for each of the 36 months of 2014 to 2016; thus, our sample consists of
172,800 observations (36 months times 2 days times 24 hours times 100 bids). Based on the
estimation equations (37) and (38) we can calculate the elasticities for our model (see (39)
and (40)).
lnpdemhq “ ↵hlnpphq `
ÿ
i
 i,hdi ˚ lnpphq(37)
lnpsuphq “ ↵hlnpphq `
ÿ
i
 i,hdi ˚ lnpphq(38)
Bdemh
Bph “ ↵h `
ÿ
i
 i,hdi(39)
Bsuph
Bph “ ↵h `
ÿ
i
 i,hdi(40)
Figure 5 illustrates the demand and supply elasticities for the case of a summer working day
(SU/Work). We see that a 1% price increase would decrease demand in the evening and
night hours by about 0.08% which is almost three times as much as during daytime. The
price elasticity of supply, on the other hand, is more balanced with a very inelastic morning
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low of only 0.003 and an evening peak where supply is increased by 0.04% for a 1% increase
in prices. These elasticities play an important role for determining the prosumer’s optimal
decisions – as we also show in the Cases in Section II(ii). – since they determine the “size” of
the window of attainable market clearing prices (see Figure 2). The elasticities of a summer
working day indicate that this window is largest in terms of prices during daytime, and in
particular in the hours 9 to 14. Tables containing all supply and demand elasticities for the
6 typical days can be found in Appendix B
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Estimation Results for Price Elasticities (SU/Work): (a) Demand Elasticities, (b)
Supply Elasticities
III(i).ii Scenario Definition
We use the estimation results from above as well as market data to analyze the relationship
between price elasticities in diﬀerent market situations and the role of prosumer size. There-
fore, we will first define a base scenario followed by diﬀerent variations from the base scenario
that we take into account. For all scenarios we assume the prosumer’s hourly demand to
follow the pattern of the market by assigning to him 1% of overall hourly market clearing
quantities; i.e. for an hour with e.g. 40,000 MW sold on the market, the prosumer’s demand
is 400 MW. The prosumer’s average demand is approximately 550 MW, with a minimum at
375 MW and a maximum at 753 MW.
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• Base Scenario
Figure 6 shows the development of the market prices and quantities in the 144 typical
hours. In the base scenario we assume that the production capacity of the prosumer
is close to his average hourly consumption, that is about 600 MW; and the production
costs are assumed to be close to the average market price of about 30 EUR/MWh.
Figure 6: Market Prices and Corresponding Volumes for the Typical Days
• Variations from Base Scenario
To get a better understanding of the relationship between prosumer size and costs and
optimal market behavior we want to vary on the one hand the production capacity of
the prosumer and on the other hand the production costs. For the capacity we choose
in addition diﬀerent cases of capacity around the maximum hourly consumption and
minimum hourly consumption. For the production costs we choose overall five scenarios:
10 EUR/MWh and 20 EUR/MWh higher and lower than the average market price of
about 30 EUR/MWh. This is in the range of expected levelized cost of energy for
decentralized generation (see Comello & Reichelstein 2016).
With this information we can determine for every typical day and the corresponding hours
the optimal behavior of the prosumer, the corresponding “new” market price, and the profit
advantage compared to passive prosumption.
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III(ii). Results
For each of these 30 scenarios we derived the prosumer’s optimal market behavior, i.e. market
production, market demand and self-supply. Figure 14 in Appendix D contains these optimal
values for all 4,320 typical hours (6 days times 24 hours times 30 scenarios). Here, we present
one exemplary scenario, viz. 1200/10, in Figure 7 where the x-axis depicts the 6 typical days
with their 144 hours. In most of the hours, self-supply and market production are equal to
the prosumer’s production capacity, QPSs , i.e. no capacity remains unused. The prosumer
does not cover his demand QPSd on the market and is thus a Pure Monopolist as we defined in
Case B. The market clearing price is mostly higher than the prosumer’s production costs of 10
EUR/MWh (see Figure 6); however, when these values are close, in particular in TS/Wend
and SU/Wend, we observe that the prosumer acts as a Standard Market Participant (Case
C) selling all of his production capacity on the market and at the same time covering all
of his demand on the same market. Surprisingly, maximally decreasing the market clearing
price with supply and increasing it at the same time with demand seems to be optimally in
the end. This example highlights that the prosumer’s decisions not only depend on his own
characteristics, i.e. production costs and capacity as well as demand, but also on the market
environment via diﬀerent hourly demand and supply elasticities and market clearing prices.
It is, however, not clear which eﬀect or relation is most influential. Lastly, we also observe a
negative spike of market production during a few hours in TS/Wend; self-supply and market
production do not add up to production capacity indicating that the prosumer withholds
capacity from the market, i.e. acts as a Partial Supplier (Case CD).
Including again all 4,320 observations hours, we proceed by classifying the results according
to the cases described in Section II(ii). above and by deriving their distribution. Figure 8
shows the frequency of the diﬀerent outcomes. Part (a) on the left depicts the distribution of
cases for diﬀerent production capacities, whereas Part (b) on the right shows the distributions
for diﬀerent prosumer’s production costs. The values of the former are derived by calculating
e.g. for all 5 scenarios containing 200 MW of production capacity the average frequency each
case occurs. E.g. Case B occurred in all 6 diﬀerent capacity scenarios on average 83 times.
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Figure 7: Optimal Prosumer Decisions for Production Capacity of 1200 MW and Production
Costs of 10 EUR/MWh
This is done to eliminate the fourth dimension of costs and we used the same procedure for
Part (b) accordingly. Overall, Cases B (Pure Monopolist), AD (Strategic Monopsonist), and
D (Pure Monopsonist) are the most relevant ones. Part (a) indicates that choosing Case D,
i.e. being a simple consumer, is insensitive to changing production capacity. Cases B and
Case AD, on the other hand, depend strongly on the size of capacity, with the incidence
of the latter decreasing, and the former showing a maximum at 800 MW. We also see that
additional production capacity induces the prosumer to choose between more strategic cases
– 2 Cases vs. 7 Cases – because the window of attainable market clearing prices (see Figure 2)
is increased. Being able to choose only Case B or Case D is not diﬀerent from being a passive
prosumer, i.e. just a small amount of production capacity does not seem to yield any profit
advantage at the first glance. In Part (b) the amount of each case appearing varies strongly
with a transition of Case B to D as costs are higher and the number of hours where costs are
larger than the market clearing price increases; i.e. the prosumer has fewer opportunities to
profitably produce for the market and switches to be a simple consumer.
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(a) (b)
Figure 8: Equilibrium Outcomes According to (a) Production Capacity and (b) Production
Costs
III(ii).i General Analysis of Active Prosumption
As a first step to analyze the diﬀerent eﬀects in detail, Figure 9 gives the average impact of
active prosumption on the market clearing price. This is calculated as the diﬀerence of the
market clearing price including and the price excluding the prosumer. We see that with small
prosumers, the new market price will always be higher than before as their production ca-
pacity does not suﬃce to cover their market demand. This leads to an excess market demand
situation driving prices up. The slight kink e.g. in the graph for costs of 50 EUR/MWh at
a capacity of 800 MW indicates that higher production costs prove to be a “natural” barrier
preventing the prosumer to further decrease the market clearing price by e.g. starting to
withhold capacity. With low production costs of e.g. 10 EUR/MWh this barrier is not bind-
ing and the final market clearing price will even be lower in the optimum; this is relevant for
capacities larger than 600 MW in our empirical study.
The development of the prosumer’s market demand and market production (y-axis) for dif-
ferent production capacities (x-axis) and diﬀerent production costs is shown in Figure 10.
The values are summed quantities of the 144 typical hours within one scenario. Given his
own production capacity the prosumer will increasingly sell to the market when his capacity
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Figure 9: Average Impact on Market Clearing Price
increases. However, increasing the prosumer’s capacity relative to the total market supply
also leads to a decreasing market price which at the same time increases the prosumer’s
market demand. This can be seen in the graphs for costs of 10 and 20 EUR/MWh in Part
(a) – with the additional influence of the “outliers” of Cases C which we find in scenarios
1000/10, 1000/20, 1200/10, and 1200/20. For higher prosumer’s production costs this eﬀect
is not likely to occur because of lacking competitiveness relative to the market. This is also
shown by the flat market production graphs for costs of 40 and 50 EUR/MWh in Part (b);
and by the flat parts of the top cost graphs in Part (a).
The observation from above, viz. that increasing production capacity leads to increased
market production, can also be visualized by plotting the ratio of residual production capacity
to total market supply, pQPSd ´QPSs q{´Qmarkets , against the derived optimal market production
for all 4,320 observations (see Figure 11). Depending on the scenario, this ratio will be
negative if the prosumer’s hourly demand is larger than his production capacity; and as we
can see on the left side in Figure 11 the prosumer will never choose to sell any production on
the market. This ratio turns positive, on the other hand, when the prosumer’s production
capacity is larger than demand. I.e. the prosumer will only start to participate on the supply
side of the market if he owns a minimum amount of production capacity that additionally
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(a) (b)
Figure 10: (a) Market Demand and (b) Market Production for Diﬀerent PS Production Costs
and Production Capacities
exceeds his demand with the plot indicating a linear positive relationship. We can also see the
diﬀerent strategic cases of the prosumer: the Cases B and D determine the outer borders of
this triangular shape; the observations in between are cases where the prosumer e.g. decides
to withhold capacity, like in Case AB. And the outliers where the prosumer oﬀers 1000 or
1200 MW on the market are the instances of Case C.
Figure 11: Interdependence of Available Production Capacity and Market Production
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III(ii).ii Profit Advantage of Active Prosumption
One of the results of Section II was that active prosumption is a weakly dominating strategy
and that the profit advantage depends on the relation of productions costs to market clearing
price, on the supply and demand elasticities, and on the relative size of the prosumer. Based
on our empirical study we can show this in more detail. Figure 12 shows the profits of an
excess producer, i.e. a Pure Monopolist (Case B) and of an active prosumer for all levels of
production capacity and diﬀerentiated according to production costs. The values are derived
by summing up all profits of the 144 typical hours. As capacity increases there are more and
more incidents where the prosumer can be 100% self suﬃcient and where excess production
will decrease the market clearing price. Part (a) shows that the Pure Monopolist’s profit can
even decline with increasing production costs because the excess production will even push
prices below costs; at some point, of course, this Pure Monopolist should choose to become
a simple consumer, i.e. a Pure Monopsonist (Case D). An active prosumer, on the other
hand, can prevent this by actively adjusting and reacting to the market environment e.g. by
withholding capacity from the market. Again, the profits are negative because we do not
take the utility of demand into account; thus the advantage of active prosumption consists
of restricting losses. In addition, we see the stated weak dominance in Part (b) for example
for costs of 20 EUR/MWh because profits are equal at low capacities, but when production
capacity increases, the active prosumer even has an additional advantage (see also Figure 11
above).
In the final Figure 13 we plot the absolute hourly profit advantages of active prosumption
for all 4,320 observations; as defined in Section II(iv). the profits of a passive prosumer are
calculated by allowing him to choose between excess production or simple consumption, i.e.
between Case B and D. We can confirm the analytical result that the advantage is highest
when the market clearing price is close to the production costs. The “peak” for costs of
10 EUR/MWh is only small as the distribution is truncated below by the observed market
clearing prices in our 144 typical hours with a minimum at 12.84 EUR/MWh. Per unit profit
increases range from 0.01 to 0.03 EUR/MWh for the smallest case of 200 MW production
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(a) (b)
Figure 12: Sum of Profits of (a) Pure Monopolist (Case B) and (b) Active Prosumer
capacity and up to 0.03 to 2.52 EUR/MWh for the largest depicted case of 1200 MW pro-
duction capacity for diﬀerent cost levels. Extending capacity up to 8700 MW enables the
prosumer to raise per unit profits from 9.7 to 13.4 EUR/MWh.
In addition, variance is higher with higher production costs. Since each set of data points
for production costs contains all six assumed production capacities, we have to resort to
the distribution of strategic cases shown in Part (a) of Figure 8 above for an explanation.
There we see that, keeping the costs constant, additional capacity increases the options for
a prosumer. Hence, we expect more production capacity to lead to a greater leeway in
strategically influencing market outcomes. This is ultimately based on the larger window
of attainable market clearing prices (see Figure 2) as production capacity increases. For
a more detailed analysis on this, we also calculated our model for a prosumer production
capacity of 8700 MW comparing to one of the largest direct sellers at current EPEXSpot,
Statkraft. We observe that this higher capacity results in the prosumer playing more the role
of a Strategic Monopolist (case AB, 22% of all situations) or a Partial Supplier (case CD,
26% of all situations). The reason for this is that bidding the total capacity into the market
would decrease the prices too much and thus decrease own profits. In contrast, the frequency
of being residual Pure Monopolist (case B) reduces, which is a consequence of increased
market power. The role Pure Monopsonist (case D) is independent of the production capacity
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and remains at 36% of all situations. Lastly, the position of the peaks also indicates that
prosumers with diﬀerent production technologies and therefore diﬀerent production costs
will be active in diﬀerent zones of market clearing prices. Hence, active prosumption is a
profitable strategy for all market participants who simultaneously demand from and supply
to the market.
Figure 13: Profit Advantage of Active vs. Passive Prosumption
IV Discussion
The proposed model is based on several important assumptions that need to be taken into
account for interpreting the results. First, the prosumer influences the market clearing price
by rotating both the demand and supply functions as he chooses the quantities to demand
from and supply to the market. We found that assuming a parallel shift does not change
the main results of our analysis which diﬀer only in quantitative terms. Second, the de-
mand and supply functions are assumed to be linear, whereas in the EPEXSpot day-ahead
electricity market they are highly nonlinear (hockey-stick form) and actually step functions
with, on average, 700 steps per hour. We are able to handle this nonlinearity by estimating
the elasticities and calculating the slopes at the various market equilibria; incorporating step
functions would deprive us of the analytical analysis of an additional prosumer. Third, we
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also assumed that the prosumer has perfect foresight of and his eﬀect on the market clearing
price. Again regarding the electricity market, the forecasts of day-ahead prices are quite ac-
curate and, as we show in Figure 13 in Section III(ii).ii, each distribution of profit advantages
covers a range of prices; i.e. it is not necessary to perfectly know the market environment
in order to gain an advantage, it suﬃces to be close enough. And fourth, concerning the
profit advantage, we implicitly assume that all the 144 typical hours are equally likely to
appear during a year. We could additionally extrapolate these 144 hourly profit advantages
to e.g. an assumed typical year. This does, however, not seem meaningful as our model and
in particular the production costs are highly simplified and the additional information gained
by this exercise is unclear. We do for example not include startup costs after not using or
withholding production capacity, or ramp-up/down delays for changing the actual quantity
produced which only occur when production capacity is not simply relayed from market to
self-supply.
Several issues had to be reserved for future work. As of yet, the prosumer’s production
capacity is modeled as if it were just one unit with uniform production costs. The natural
extension would be to model a portfolio of units with diﬀerent production costs each, i.e.
to a multi-unit commitment problem. Also, since active prosumption leads to a profit ad-
vantage, this business model will attract multiple active prosumers. Thus, the model must
be generalized to more than one single active prosumer in order to check for interactions or
concerted actions between these new market participants. In a next step, it is also impor-
tant to disentangle the three eﬀects on the prosumer’s optimal decision, viz. the relation of
(a) market clearing price to production costs, (b) demand and production capacity, and (c)
elasticities.
As stated in Section III(i).i above, the elasticities indicate major prosumer action in hours
9-14 because the window of attainable prices is largest; this does, however, not include
information on the general price level, i.e. of eﬀect (a). Finding a way to disentangle these
eﬀects could indicate hours where we expect an increase of active prosumption. So far, we
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only observe profit gains when production costs and market clearing prices are suﬃciently
close (cf. 13). Finally, concerning active prosumption in electricity markets, the model
may be extended by including further markets, e.g. balancing market providing flexibility.
Prosumption seems to be a simple way to flexibly adapt to the market environment as, in
particular, relaying production from the market to self-supply does not involve any physical
constraints, but price signals between those markets may diﬀer a lot changing the prosumer’s
incentives. Second, the results are based on the active prosumer’s impact on the market
clearing price, which should work even better in markets based on nodal pricing. This is
because the relative size of a prosumer as well as his impact on the price is even larger
in load pockets which occur due to transmission congestion. By comparison, our empirical
study was based on a small prosumer with only 1 % of total market demand and between
0.3 and 1.5 % of total market supply. In a further sensitivity analysis, an increase to roughly
10 % market share already led to tremendous profit gains. And lastly, an extension must
focus on giving the prosumer the possibility to intertemporally shift supply and/or demand
via storage or flexibility. Even though this is an important and very recent topic in the
electricity market – including the new term of “ProSumAge” (see Green & Staﬀell 2017) –
this is also important for other market environments where storing supply is possible, like
e.g. for farmers who can feed their cattle or store the grain in silos.
V Conclusion
In this article we address the important issue of consumer market participation when there is
the possibility to – at least partially – rely on marketable own production. Theoretical results
indicate that the optimal choices of production, sales and sourcing crucially depend on own
production costs and capacity as well as own demand relative to market equilibrium. We
apply our model to the electricity market. Varying scarcity situations reveal the prosumer
to switch strategic roles, from net buyer to net supplier, on an hourly basis. In particular,
the prosumer exerts market power in peak as well as oﬀ-peak situations. This is in part due
to the additional influence on market enabling her to increase market power and to substan-
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tially increase profits even with relatively low market shares. In general, these results apply
to any market where the same participant is able to simultaneously demand from and oﬀer
to a market having an impact on market price. The potential to either increase supply or
exert market power demonstrates the ambivalent role a prosumer can take with regard to
allocative eﬃciency. This also holds for other markets than electricity such as transportation
(Uber), overnight stays (AirBnB), or car-sharing markets. Further examples are Amazon’s
or Google’s server farms whose processing power may be used for their own tasks or of-
fered to other customers. This has manifold implications for assessing strategic behavior in
vertically integrated markets as well as for competition policy and regulation. Regarding
electricity markets, active prosumption is a new way for companies to vertically integrate.
This “Un-Unbundling” may serve to circumvent regulations and potentially undermine the
liberalization of the market.
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Notes
1E.g. the Big 6 in the UK or the Big 4 in Germany compare to e.g. 150,000 private solar power systems
in Finland (TEM 2014) or to 34,000 small scale prosumer systems (including storage) in Germany.
2 See Selectra (2017), innogy (2017).
3 It is worth noting that active prosumption diﬀers from other forms of market participation such as shifting
demand and/or storage (intertemporal arbitrage, see Crampes & Creti (2006), Ottesen et al. (2016)). There is
also the option of virtual bidding, which is a purely financial transaction without the actual risk of operating
a generating unit or of needing to cover physical demand. This is usually done to generate arbitrage profits
between sequential markets and the transactions must be undone again before actual delivery to or from the
virtual bidder takes place (see Jha & Wolak 2015, van Eijkel et al. 2016). We do not address these issues in
this article.
4 An analysis of possible principal-agent issues and of optimal contractual design of this arrangement must
be left for future analyses.
5This is similar for other markets such as taxi rides (Uber) or overnight stays (AirBnB).
6We further assume the consumer to have an inelastic demand, therefore no optimization with respect to
consumption takes place.
7This cost can also include opportunity cost.
8Bessembinder & Lemmon (2006) find local disequilibria to provide another explanation for this phe-
nomenon. Convex cost functions in combination with locally varying demand make it profitable to hedge
throughout space and adapt real-time supply and demand locally.
9Avenel (2008) investigates the related issue of the optimal degree of vertical integration of a firm in
light of technology adoption. In contrast, this article focuses on consumer market participation based on
production by new, decentralized technologies.
10The prosumer’s eﬀect could also be modelled as a parallel shift of both functions. Testing such a model
showed, however, that the results diﬀer only in quantitative terms and remain the same regarding the main
points we try to make in this paper. The most realistic approach is leaving the functions unaﬀected up to the
“step” the prosumer introduces and introducing a parallel shift. This nonlinearity introduces many equilibria
and does again not help us forward our case.
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A Equations for X (Optimal qPSs ) and Y (Optimal qPSd )
The optimal hourly quantities the prosumer produces for and demands from the market, i.e.
qPSs ) and qPSd , respectively, are derived based on Equations 4) and (5 (see Section II(ii).).
Solving the partial derivatives, setting the resulting total derivative to 0, and isolating the
respective decision variables yields the optimal (unconstrained) decision variables stated in
the equations below:
q˚,PSs “ x y
ad
´Qmarkets ´
b
a2d pad ´ asq x y pas ´ cPSq p´x y ` ad pqPSd `Qmarkets qq
a2d pas ´ cPSq
q˚,PSd “
ad z
x
´Qmarketd `
b
ad pad ´ asq x2 z pad ´ cPS ` ⌧q p´ x pqPSs `Qmarketd q ` ad zq
x2 pad ´ cPS ` ⌧q
where
x “ as ´ cmarket
y “ qPSd `Qmarketd
z “ qPSs `Qmarkets
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B Estimated Demand and Supply Elasticities
Table II
Demand Elasticities for the 24 Hours on the 6 Typical Days
TS Work WI Work SU Work TS Wend WI Wend SU Wend
h1 -0.032 -0.044 -0.082 -0.049 -0.001 -0.059
h2 -0.021 -0.036 -0.083 -0.041 -0.001 -0.050
h3 -0.014 -0.035 -0.081 -0.041 -0.001 -0.045
h4 -0.009 -0.037 -0.082 -0.044 -0.001 -0.044
h5 -0.012 -0.039 -0.082 -0.048 -0.001 -0.044
h6 -0.020 -0.043 -0.085 -0.050 -0.001 -0.054
h7 -0.031 -0.037 -0.077 -0.048 -0.004 -0.068
h8 -0.049 -0.021 -0.054 -0.031 -0.023 -0.078
h9 -0.049 -0.009 -0.033 -0.019 -0.029 -0.071
h10 -0.050 -0.023 -0.033 -0.023 -0.036 -0.063
h11 -0.050 -0.039 -0.037 -0.031 -0.039 -0.058
h12 -0.047 -0.047 -0.035 -0.034 -0.041 -0.053
h13 -0.039 -0.048 -0.032 -0.030 -0.038 -0.045
h14 -0.037 -0.044 -0.028 -0.027 -0.041 -0.042
h15 -0.035 -0.043 -0.023 -0.026 -0.044 -0.037
h16 -0.038 -0.040 -0.024 -0.026 -0.051 -0.034
h17 -0.043 -0.038 -0.026 -0.030 -0.043 -0.039
h18 -0.052 -0.030 -0.035 -0.038 -0.031 -0.060
h19 -0.059 -0.028 -0.047 -0.043 -0.028 -0.079
h20 -0.062 -0.030 -0.061 -0.047 -0.031 -0.092
h21 -0.068 -0.055 -0.093 -0.064 -0.040 -0.099
h22 -0.059 -0.061 -0.092 -0.066 -0.038 -0.088
h23 -0.053 -0.060 -0.090 -0.068 -0.029 -0.077
h24 -0.046 -0.056 -0.084 -0.064 -0.017 -0.064
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Table III
Supply Elasticities for the 24 Hours on the 6 Typical Days
TS Work WI Work SU Work TS Wend WI Wend SU Wend
h1 0.057 0.075 0.019 0.067 0.099 0.035
h2 0.058 0.072 0.019 0.066 0.100 0.037
h3 0.058 0.070 0.020 0.064 0.100 0.038
h4 0.058 0.068 0.022 0.059 0.099 0.039
h5 0.059 0.064 0.020 0.055 0.100 0.040
h6 0.062 0.058 0.010 0.045 0.102 0.045
h7 0.066 0.042 0.003 0.027 0.106 0.045
h8 0.056 0.039 0.012 0.028 0.092 0.040
h9 0.039 0.037 0.015 0.028 0.068 0.029
h10 0.031 0.024 0.019 0.030 0.046 0.027
h11 0.025 0.009 0.015 0.024 0.033 0.022
h12 0.024 0.002 0.016 0.024 0.026 0.021
h13 0.025 0.001 0.016 0.025 0.022 0.022
h14 0.029 0.001 0.017 0.025 0.021 0.027
h15 0.033 0.001 0.024 0.030 0.023 0.036
h16 0.036 0.001 0.029 0.033 0.026 0.046
h17 0.039 0.008 0.036 0.038 0.037 0.053
h18 0.040 0.026 0.041 0.042 0.048 0.050
h19 0.042 0.046 0.041 0.048 0.064 0.041
h20 0.046 0.061 0.034 0.050 0.078 0.033
h21 0.057 0.062 0.019 0.053 0.093 0.033
h22 0.062 0.070 0.021 0.059 0.096 0.032
h23 0.060 0.070 0.022 0.061 0.096 0.033
h24 0.062 0.076 0.026 0.067 0.104 0.037
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C Calculated Demand and Supply Slopes
Table IV
Slopes of Demand Curve for the 6 Typical Days
TS Work WI Work SU Work TS Wend WI Wend SU Wend
h1 -0.018 -0.012 -0.008 -0.011 -0.429 -0.011
h2 -0.025 -0.015 -0.007 -0.012 -0.422 -0.011
h3 -0.035 -0.016 -0.007 -0.012 -0.416 -0.011
h4 -0.049 -0.015 -0.006 -0.011 -0.407 -0.011
h5 -0.037 -0.014 -0.006 -0.009 -0.393 -0.011
h6 -0.023 -0.012 -0.006 -0.009 -0.404 -0.008
h7 -0.018 -0.016 -0.007 -0.008 -0.085 -0.006
h8 -0.013 -0.033 -0.011 -0.013 -0.017 -0.005
h9 -0.014 -0.085 -0.019 -0.023 -0.014 -0.005
h10 -0.012 -0.031 -0.018 -0.018 -0.014 -0.006
h11 -0.011 -0.018 -0.015 -0.013 -0.012 -0.007
h12 -0.011 -0.014 -0.016 -0.011 -0.012 -0.007
h13 -0.013 -0.014 -0.016 -0.012 -0.013 -0.008
h14 -0.013 -0.015 -0.018 -0.010 -0.011 -0.007
h15 -0.013 -0.015 -0.022 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008
h16 -0.013 -0.017 -0.021 -0.011 -0.008 -0.008
h17 -0.011 -0.018 -0.020 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008
h18 -0.011 -0.026 -0.016 -0.011 -0.018 -0.006
h19 -0.011 -0.029 -0.013 -0.013 -0.021 -0.006
h20 -0.011 -0.025 -0.011 -0.013 -0.019 -0.006
h21 -0.009 -0.012 -0.007 -0.010 -0.013 -0.006
h22 -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.013 -0.007
h23 -0.011 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.017 -0.009
h24 -0.011 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.023 -0.010
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Table V
Slopes of Supply Curves for the 6 Typical Days
TS Work WI Work SU Work TS Wend WI Wend SU Wend
h1 0.010 0.007 0.033 0.008 0.005 0.018
h2 0.009 0.008 0.032 0.008 0.004 0.015
h3 0.009 0.008 0.028 0.008 0.004 0.013
h4 0.008 0.008 0.024 0.008 0.004 0.012
h5 0.008 0.008 0.026 0.008 0.004 0.012
h6 0.007 0.009 0.049 0.010 0.004 0.009
h7 0.008 0.014 0.186 0.015 0.003 0.009
h8 0.012 0.018 0.051 0.014 0.004 0.010
h9 0.017 0.020 0.042 0.015 0.006 0.013
h10 0.019 0.030 0.031 0.014 0.011 0.015
h11 0.022 0.077 0.035 0.016 0.015 0.017
h12 0.022 0.347 0.034 0.016 0.020 0.018
h13 0.019 0.658 0.031 0.015 0.021 0.017
h14 0.016 0.656 0.029 0.011 0.021 0.012
h15 0.014 0.656 0.021 0.009 0.018 0.008
h16 0.013 0.669 0.017 0.009 0.016 0.006
h17 0.013 0.085 0.014 0.008 0.012 0.006
h18 0.014 0.030 0.014 0.010 0.012 0.008
h19 0.015 0.017 0.015 0.011 0.010 0.012
h20 0.015 0.012 0.020 0.013 0.007 0.018
h21 0.011 0.011 0.035 0.011 0.006 0.019
h22 0.010 0.008 0.032 0.010 0.005 0.020
h23 0.010 0.008 0.032 0.010 0.005 0.022
h24 0.008 0.007 0.025 0.008 0.004 0.017
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D Summary of Optimal Prosumer Decisions
Figure 14: Optimal PS Decisions for 4,320 Typical Hours
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